Unlike economies as a whole, manufacturing industries exhibit strong unconditional convergence in labor productivity. The paper documents this at various levels of disaggregation for a large sample covering more than 100 countries over recent decades. The result is highly robust to changes in the sample and specification. The coefficient of unconditional convergence is estimated quite precisely and is large, at between 2-3 percent in most specifications and 2.9 percent per year in the baseline specification covering 118 countries. The paper also finds substantial sigma-convergence at the 2-digit level for a smaller sample of countries. Despite strong convergence within manufacturing, aggregate convergence fails due to the small share of manufacturing employment in low income countries and the slow pace of industrialization. Because of data coverage, these findings should be as viewed as applying to the organized, formal parts of manufacturing. * This is a substantially revised version of Rodrik (2011). I am grateful to UNIDO for making the INDSTAT2 and INDSTAT4 data bases available. I also thank Cynthia Balloch for research assistance, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and the Center for International Development at Harvard for financial assistance, and Alberto Abadie, Daron Acemoglu, Jonathan Temple, three referees, and the editors for very useful suggestions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Neoclassical growth theory establishes a presumption that countries with access to identical technologies should converge to a common income level. Countries that are poorer and have higher marginal productivity of capital should grow more rapidly in the transition to the long-run steady state. In an open global economy, access to foreign capital and foreign markets (which removes finance and market size as constraints) further strengthens the presumption of convergence.
However, empirical work has not been kind to this proposition. Selected developing countries, such as those in East Asia, have grown fast. But when poor countries are taken as a whole, there is no systematic tendency for them to grow faster than rich ones, over any reasonably long time horizon for which we have data. 1 Whatever convergence one can find is conditional: it depends on policies, institutions, and other country-specific circumstances. The only clear-cut exceptions to the rule seem to be states/regions within a unified economy such as the United States (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991) .
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If growth rates are characterized by conditional instead of unconditional convergence, economies will tend towards different levels of income in the long-run. Lack of empirical support for (unconditional) convergence has led theory in the direction of models with endogenous technological change, which don't necessarily exhibit convergence, and to empirical work that focuses on identifying the conditioning variables that makes convergence feasible (see Acemoglu [2009] on theory and Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple [2005] on empirical work). 1 On convergence in the decade before the global financial crisis of -2009 see Subramanian 2011 , chap. 4, and Rodrik 2011 2 Some studies also find unconditional convergence among the richer OECD countries, but it is difficult to know what to make of this result in light of the obvious sample-selection bias (Baumol 1986; DeLong 1988) .
In contrast to this large literature, I show in this paper that unconditional convergence does exist, but that it occurs in the modern parts of the economy rather than the economy as a whole. In particular, I document a highly robust tendency towards convergence in labor productivity in manufacturing activities, regardless of geography, policies, or other country-level influences. The coefficient of unconditional convergence ("beta") is large -2.9 percent per year in my baseline specification which covers 118 countries -and estimated quite precisely, with more disaggregated specifications generally yielding somewhat higher estimates. A convergence rate of 2.9 percent implies that industries that are, say, a tenth of the way to the technology frontier (roughly the bottom 20 percent of the industries in our sample) experience a convergence boost in their labor productivity growth of 6.7 percentage points per annum (0.029 × ln(10)).
Figures IA, IB, and IC illustrate the central result of this paper and place it in proper perspective. Each figure shows the relationship between labor productivity in some base period (on the vertical axis) and its growth rate over the subsequent decade, controlling for periodspecific influences. Figure IA , where each dot stands for a particular country in a specific decade, presents a typical non-convergence result for country-level productivity. There is no systematic tendency for countries that start with lower productivity (measured here by GDP per worker) to grow more rapidly. (The need for period and industry fixed effects will be motivated subsequently.) The negative and highly significant slope is unmistakable, illustrating the central conclusion of this paper: manufacturing exhibits a strong tendency for unconditional convergence. Industries that start at lower levels of labor productivity experience more rapid growth in labor productivity. As I will show below, when country fixed effects are included the slope becomes even steeper.
Conditional convergence is more rapid than unconditional convergence. But what is striking in Figure IB is the evident strength of convergence in the data even in the absence of such controls. Figure 1C shows the same convergence result for manufacturing in aggregate, with labels identifying each country.
3
My focus in this paper is on what it is called "beta-convergence," where "beta" refers to the slope of the relationship in Figures IA-IC. But I will also present evidence for significant "sigma-convergence," referring to convergence in productivity levels, at least for recent time periods. Even if beta-convergence holds, countries may fail to converge in levels as long as random shocks to the growth process are relatively large. 4 In our sample of industries, beta-and sigma-convergence go together. I find that productivity dispersion was sharply reduced across countries during [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] in the majority of 2-digit manufacturing industries. In manufacturing taken as a whole, sigma shrunk by 10 log-points during this period in the sample of 63 countries for which comparison is possible -a reduction of the order of 10 percent.
I note that my data come from UNIDO's industrial statistics data base, which is derived largely from industrial surveys. Since microenterprises and informal firms are often excluded from such surveys, we cannot be certain that the results are universally valid across all types of manufacturing activities. In the absence of more complete coverage of manufacturing, these findings on convergence should be as viewed as applying to the organized, formal parts of manufacturing.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to demonstrate unconditional convergence in industry for a wide range of countries and for detailed manufacturing industries. There does not seem to be any work that has looked at highly disaggregated data for manufacturing or at the manufacturing experience of countries beyond OECD and U.S. states Jones, 1996a and 1996b; see also Sørensen 2001) . However, two recent related studies deserve mention. In unpublished work, Hwang (2007, chap. 3) has documented that there is a tendency for unconditional convergence in export unit values in highly disaggregated product lines. Once a country begins to export something, it travels up the value chain in that product regardless of domestic policies or institutions. 5 Hwang shows that the lower the average unit values of a country's manufactured exports, the faster the country's subsequent growth, unconditionally.
This paper differs from Hwang in that it focuses on output rather than exports, and directly on productivity (rather than unit values). Convergence seems to kick in manufacturing regardless of 5 Hwang demonstrates his result for both 10-digit U.S. HS import statistics and 4-digit SITC world trade statistics. The first classification contains thousands of separate product lines.
-5-whether production is exported. 6 In addition, a recent paper by Bénétrix, O'Rourke, and Williamson (2012) manufacturing's impact on aggregate convergence is curtailed by its small size, especially in the poorer countries. Third, the growth boost from reallocation -the shift of labor to more productive manufacturing -is not sufficiently and systematically greater in poorer economies.
Taken together, these three facts account for the absence of aggregate convergence.
The analysis highlights the role of structural factors, in particular the slow (and sometimes perverse) movement of resources across economic activities with different convergence characteristics. The trouble from a convergence standpoint is that economic activities that are good at absorbing advanced technologies are not necessarily also good at absorbing labor. As a result, too large a fraction of an economy's resources can get stuck in the "wrong" sectors -those that are not on the escalator up. When firms that are part of 6 Also related is a paper by Levchenko and Zhang (2011) which estimates model-based relative productivity trends for 19 manufacturing industries from the 1960s through the 2000 and show that there has been steady convergence across countries. 7 The first version of this paper was completed before I became aware of Bénétrix et al.'s (2012) work on the subject.
international production networks or otherwise benefit from globalization employ little labor, the gains remain limited. Even worse, inter-sectoral labor flows can be perverse with the consequence that convergence within the "advanced" sectors is accompanied by divergence on the part of the economy as a whole. McMillan and Rodrik (2011) illustrate some of these perverse outcomes using the experience of specific countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the data and methods used for the estimation. Section III presents the basic results and various robustness checks. Section IV considers the reasons for why convergence fails to aggregate up to the level of the entire economy. Section V provides concluding remarks.
II. DATA AND METHODS
A. Date source and description. I use data from UNIDO's INDSTAT2 and INDSTAT4 data bases, which provide industrial statistics for a wide range of countries at different levels of disaggregation (UNIDO 2011 (UNIDO , 2012 . My baseline sample is based on INDSTAT2 which has good coverage of countries at the ISIC 2-digit level going back to the 1960s. These statistics cover value added and employment, among others, for up to 23 manufacturing industries per country, allowing me to calculate labor productivity (value added per employee) and its growth at that level of disaggregation. INDSTAT4 provides more disaggregated data at the 4-digit level for up to 127 industries, but covers fewer countries and is spotty for earlier years, making it impractical to work with it for periods that extend before 1990. An earlier version of this paper reported substantially similar results using INDSTAT4 (Rodrik 2011a) . In this paper, I rely mostly on INDSTAT2, which has the advantage of allowing me to increase the country coverage industries, the total number of observations in the baseline specification is greater than 2,000.
We shall supplement this sample with two others to check for robustness and carry out further analyses:
(a) A panel, which stacks the four decades 1965-1975, 1975-1985, 1985-1995, and 1995-2005 for all countries with data for at least one of those decades. The panel sample covers a relatively large number of countries (99 in all). Its disadvantage is that it is highly unbalanced, with developed countries having much better coverage than developing ones. given in turn by = v − , where is the increase in the industry-level deflator in dollar terms and a hat over a variable denotes percent changes.
-9-We assume (real) labor productivity growth in each industry is a function of both country-specific conditions and a convergence effect. The latter in turn is proportional to the gap between each industry's initial productivity and its frontier technology, represented by v * .
Hence:
where is a dummy variable that stands in for all time-and industry-invariant country-specific factors. The convergence coefficient we are interested in estimating is β. Note that if ln v is measured with error, this specification potentially introduces a bias towards over-estimating the rate of convergence, since such an error weakens the link between initial productivity and final productivity. This is a common problem in the empirical literature on convergence (Temple 1998 This allows us to express the growth of nominal labor productivity as follows:
We assume is uncorrelated with other explanatory variables and captures all other idiosyncratic influences on measured labor productivity. Re-arranging terms, we now have our It is also possible to run this regression over a single time period, as a pure cross-section.
In this case, the industry × time period fixed effects are reduced to industry fixed effects:
(3') v = −β ln v + + + .
As specified, our estimate of β will be a measure of conditional convergence, since country-specific conditions are explicitly controlled for by the country fixed effects. A test of unconditional convergence consists of dropping these country dummies and checking whether the estimated coefficient -β remains negative and statistically significant.
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III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A.
Basic results. Table I shows the results for the baseline specification along with its variants. The dependent variable in each case is the (compound annual) growth rate of labor productivity for 2-digit manufacturing industries. The regressors are the log of initial labor productivity and a host of fixed effects, depending on the specification. Each regression is run first without and then with country dummies. As explained previously, these two specifications yield the unconditional and conditional convergence coefficients, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level in all specifications.
Column (1) is the baseline result, corresponding to the scatter plot displayed in Figure IB .
The estimated convergence coefficient of 2.9 percent is highly significant, with a t-statistic of 6.95. Recall that the baseline sample pools different decades for each country. There is little evidence of parameter heterogeneity across different time periods, however. We get quite similar estimates when we drop pre-1990 observations from the baseline specification (column (3)) or when we run a pure cross-section for the more recent period 1995-2005 (column (5)). 9 We take note of the fact that the 1995-2005 results do not diverge much from the baseline as we will have to focus on the cross-section for some of the subsequent analysis.
The panel specification, which combines the four decades 1965-1975, 1975-1985, 1985-1995, and 1995-2005 , yields a somewhat smaller β of 1.8 percent, but this estimate is still highly significant with a t-statistic of 6.74 (column (7)). In column (9) there is no evidence of stronger convergence in more recent decades. This is somewhat surprising since we might have expected globalization and the spread of global production networks to greatly facilitate technological dissemination and therefore catch-up. The result suggests convergence is an intrinsic property of manufacturing industries, and one that is not driven by the ups and downs of global economic integration.
Each specification in Table I is paired with its conditional variant, which includes country fixed effects. The estimated convergence coefficients always increase in size, typically doubling -or tripling, in the panel specification -when country dummies are included. This is in line with the conditional convergence results in the literature. As noted recently by Barro (2012) , there are reasons to think growth regressions with country fixed effects yield upwardly biased estimates of the convergence rate when the time horizon is short. This is due to the so-called Hurwicz-Nickell bias: the estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is biased downwards in the presence of a fixed effect (Hurwicz 1950 , Nickell 1981 . The bias tends to zero as the time span gets large, but can be large in short panels. 10 For our purposes, since we are mainly interested in unconditional convergence (and hence the specifications without country fixed effects), it suffices to treat the conditional convergence estimates as upper bounds. They still provide a useful reference point for gauging the magnitude of the unconditional convergence rates.
It is to be expected that country-specific conditions that are correlated with initial productivity -policies, institutions, geography -play a role in determining the speed of catchup. So even in the absence of the Hurwicz-Nickell bias, it is natural that the beta coefficient 10 In principle, the same bias exists when industry fixed-effects are included too, as in our baseline specification. But the dimensionality is much greater in this case since the de-meaning of the dependent variable takes place over both time periods and across countries. In any case, below I will also provide pure cross-section estimates for each industry separately, using no fixed effects.
would become larger when fixed effects are introduced. What is surprising is the evidence for systematic and rapid productivity convergence in individual manufacturing industries when these country-specific conditions are not controlled for through country dummies. Once again, there is no evidence of significant differences in convergence rates across time periods. In particular, the speed of (conditional) convergence does not appear to have increased in recent decades (col.
(10)).
In Table II , I compare the baseline with results at different levels of aggregation. The table shows specifications that are both more disaggregated (3-and 4-digit, using INDSTAT4 data) and more aggregated (manufacturing as a whole). The results in column (7) manufacturing as a whole to 3.1 percent at the 4-digit level. But these differences are not statistically significant. The similarity in the magnitude of the estimates suggests that the failure of unconditional convergence to aggregate up to the economy as a whole is not a result of compositional issues within manufacturing. We shall make use of this result later in the paper. We exclude in turn: (i) countries with fewer than ten industries; (ii) observations that correspond to the highest and lowest 10 percent values for growth; (iii) observations in the top and bottom half, respectively, of the sample in terms of labor productivity; (iv) former socialist countries;
and (v) OECD countries.
Remarkably, the convergence estimates remains highly significant across all these runs.
They vary from a low of 1.1 percent when growth observations at the top and bottom deciles are excluded (column (3)) to a high of 6.0 percent for the low-productivity half of the sample (column (4)). Note that the result becomes, if anything, stronger when OECD countries are excluded (column (7)), with the convergence coefficient rising from 2.9 to 3.8 percent. This is significant, since unconditional convergence has never been documented outside the OECD.
The bottom panel of Table III (Panel B) carries out different types of robustness tests, including weighting observations by value added, instrumenting initial labor productivity by lagged productivity (a check against measurement error), re-calculating growth rates by estimating a log-linear trend using all 10 annual observations (instead of just end-points), 11 and clustering standard errors by industry rather than country. In all these runs, the results remain highly significant. We note in particular that the estimated coefficient remains virtually unchanged when we weight industries by size (column (8)). 12 Hence the convergence result is not driven by the experience of relatively small industries. Instrumenting for initial productivity reduces the estimated β marginally to 2.4 percent (column (9)).
The last column of Table III tests directly for non-linearity of β by allowing the estimated coefficient to vary by labor productivity quartile. The results do not suggest any non-linearityat least at the 2-digit level (column (14)). There is greater evidence of non-linearity in the 4-digit data (INDSTAT4), as I reported in the earlier version of this paper (Rodrik 2011). 13 Another way to examine the data is to scrutinize the convergence evidence on an industry-by-industry basis. This exercise not only serves as a robustness test, but is interesting in its own right. We begin with a few scatter plots for individual industries. country enters these scatterplots with the latest period for which it has data. We continue to control for time-specific inflation trends by including period dummies.) Note that these plots use data from just the specified industries. As the negative slopes indicate, countries that started further behind tended to experience more rapid productivity growth in all four industries. The relationship is statistically significant at the 99 percent level in all four cases, with estimated coefficients ranging from 2.2 percent (ISIC 34) to 2.8 percent (ISIC 15).
The individual convergence coefficients estimated on an industry-by-industry basis for each of our 2-digit industries are shown in Table IV . I regress, separately for each industry, the growth rate of an industry's labor productivity against its initial level across all countries in the sample that have the requisite data for the 1995-2005 period:
This entails running as many regressions (23) as we have manufacturing industries. This is the direct analogue of running cross-country growth regressions. Note that these specifications do not contain industry, period or any other fixed effects. Many of these regressions cover 30-40 countries, so we should not be too demanding in terms of statistical significance for industryspecific estimates. Nevertheless, the results are quite strong. Among the 23 industries, we find that 18 have statistically significant convergence coefficients, ranging from a low of 1.4 percent (textiles) to a high of 5.5 percent (office, accounting, and computing machinery). All but one of the industries exhibit unconditional convergence, with wearing apparel the sole exception.
For an even more disaggregated analysis, we turn to INDSTAT4 which breaks down By contrast, none of the (few) positive coefficients are statistically significant.
There is a statistical sense in which our global estimate, which pools across industries and controls for industry fixed-effects, represents a weighted average of these industry-by-industry convergence estimates. Specifically, consider a given cross-section (such as 2000-2005 in the above). Omitting time subscripts, the relationship between estimates β and β i is given by:
where ℐdenotes an industry-identifying variable. Thus the weight that each industry estimate gets in the global estimate depends on the variance of the independent variable ln v within the industry as well as the relative number of occurrences of that industry in the global sample.
14 C.
Complications arising from price effects. One possible concern in interpreting these results is that my assumption of a common value added deflator (in dollars) for each industry, regardless of the country where it is located, may be introducing a bias to the estimation. I justified this assumption previously by arguing that the manufacturing industries in question are tradable, and hence face common world prices. Of course, we do not expect the law of one price to obtain perfectly, even for homogeneous or standardized goods. Tariffs, subsidies, non-tariff barriers, and transport costs often drive a wedge between domestic and world prices. And such wedges may well be larger in the poorer countries. Our estimation strategy can accommodate such deviations provided they do not vary over time in a way that is correlated systematically with distance from the technological frontier.
Suppose, for example, the ad valorem equivalent of trade costs is . Then
, where * is the percent change in world prices. All we need for 14 The derivation of this expression, for which I am indebted to Alberto Abadie, is available upon request.
-18-unbiased estimation is for (1 + ) to be uncorrelated with initial labor productivity ln v , conditional on a set of industry, period, and industry × period fixed effects. It is hard to think of strong reasons a priori as to why there should be such a pattern in trade cost changes.
One potential source of bias is systematic changes in real exchange rates. In principle, across-the-board increases in domestic costs such as wages should be offset, on average, by depreciation of the home currency, leaving dollar values generally unchanged. But in countries that experience sustained movements in their real exchange rate, trends in value added expressed in U.S. dollars will be misleading with regard to productivity in individual manufacturing industries. The worst case, from the perspective of the present paper, would be if the lowincome countries which house a preponderant share of low-productivity industries were the ones to experience real exchange rate appreciations -a rise in domestic costs not compensated by currency depreciation. This would lead to an upward bias in our convergence estimates.
To check against this possibility, Table III provides a version of the convergence regression which explicitly "corrects" for real exchange rate changes. I have rescaled the growth in value added per worker by deflating it with (one plus) the rate of appreciation of the country's real exchange rate. 15 This reduces -across the board -the measured productivity growth rates of industries in countries which have experienced real appreciations, while raising them in countries with real depreciations. I rerun the baseline specification using these adjusted values for the dependent variable (Table III, col. (10) ).
If observed convergence were due to real appreciation in the poorer countries, the resulting estimates would be substantially lower. In fact, the estimated β is actually slightly 15 These are conventional bilateral real exchange rates vis-à-vis the U.S. Domestic inflation rates have been calculated using producer-price indices where possible, substituting the CPI where PPI is not available. The source for the data on exchange rates and price indices is the IMF's International Financial Statistics. A few countries had to be dropped because of lack of price data.
higher (0.030) and statistically equally significant. (Note however that the sample size is somewhat reduced as the lack of price data for some of the countries prevents us from computing real exchange rate changes for them.) The bottom line is that there is no evidence that real exchange rate movements have distorted our basic findings.
Another source of possible bias arises from compositional changes. Even 4-digit industries are a mix of different activities, and what appears as an increase in dollar values may be in reality a shift towards higher value-added activities within the same industry. Equivalently, producers may be moving towards higher-quality varieties, so that what looks like productivity growth is really quality upgrading (Schott 2004; Hwang 2007) . It is possible that industries that start further away from the frontier experience such shifts more rapidly. In the presence of price data, we would have been able to capture such changes through their effect on industry-specific prices.
Such biases are potentially of concern, but our results provide some comfort that they are not very important in practice. As we saw in Table II , the estimated speed of convergence changes very little across 2-, 3-, and 4-digit levels of aggregation. If anything, the estimate increases in value as we disaggregate further. If the observed productivity growth was due to a shift towards higher-quality products, the opposite result would hold.
Furthermore, even if the compositional biases were quantitatively significant, they would not detract greatly from the convergence result which is our focus. Moving into more sophisticated, higher value-added products and increasing physical productivity are both ways of raising the available returns to labor. They are both channels for income convergence. To the extent that quality upgrading takes place generally, and it does so more rapidly in the poorer countries, it is simply another manifestation of the productive convergence we are interested in documenting.
A final interpretational difficulty relates to the possible role of entry barriers in accounting for our results. The absence of prices in our data forces us to conflate "revenue productivities" with "quantity productivity" (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson 2008; Hsieh and Klenow 2009) . Dollar values of productivity -"revenue productivities" -can change as a result of movements in prices as well as in physical productivities. The former, in turn, can be driven by shifts in entry barriers, independently of any changes in physical productivity.
Consider for example an economy in which the failure of marginal value labor productivities to equalize across sectors is due to barriers to labor mobility. As in Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), we could suppose these barriers are government-imposed restrictions such as preferential licensing or credit policies that advantage some firms or sectors over others. In this world, differences in dollar labor productivities within countries would reflect the magnitude of these barriers, and our regressions would be capturing convergence and divergence in them. 16 In particular, the "unconditional convergence" result may reflect the fact that industries with high barriers have experienced a decline in barriers while industries with low barriers have experienced an increase. Interesting as this reading of the evidence may be in its own right, it would be quite a different result than one about productivity convergence.
However, in our case we are looking at industries across countries as well as within. In fact, as the industry-by-industry regressions discussed previously (and the sigma-convergence results to be discussed below) indicate, an essential part of the identification for "unconditional convergence" is coming from the variation within industries across different countries. Revenue 16 I am grateful to a referee for raising this possibility and for the related discussion on revenue versus quantity productivity.
productivities are converging globally. It is not very plausible to attribute differences in dollar labor productivities in, say, motor vehicles across countries to differences in entry barriers faced by motor vehicle producers in different countries, or to attribute convergence in revenue productivities to systematic changes in such barriers.
In addition, since low productivity industries are in poor countries, for changes in labor mobility barriers to account for our findings, mobility barriers must have come down in poorer countries and increased in the rich countries. If this were true, we would also see much more rapid expansion in manufacturing in poor countries. As I shall show later when I discuss aggregation issues, this doesn't seem to be the case. The movement of labor into the manufacturing industries of the poorer countries is not significant or rapid enough to support such a conjecture. The sluggish pace of labor movement, and in particular the relatively slow expansion of manufacturing in the poorest countries, does not suggest systematic changes in barriers to mobility.
D.
Sigma-convergence. Beta-convergence does not guarantee sigma-convergence in a world where growth rates are driven not just by the forces of convergence but also by other determinants and shocks. The present data do not allow a very comprehensive analysis of sigmaconvergence since we need to have a large sample of countries with data both at the beginning and end of the period in order to determine whether the dispersion of productivity has diminished over any given time horizon. As discussed previously, the country coverage shrinks dramatically when we restrict the sample to a cross-section of any fixed time period.
The best that we can do is to choose a time period which maximizes the number of countries that can be included. Table V 
IV. WHY UNCONDITIONAL CONVERGENCE DOES NOT AGGREGATE UP
The forces of convergence seem quite strong in manufacturing industries. It stands to reason that we would uncover similar results for certain other parts of the economy as well, perhaps modern, tradable services such as financial or business services among others. We might expect convergence at the sectoral level to produce aggregate convergence as well, unless there are countervailing forces pushing in the other direction. Yet the aggregate data do not support this conjecture. In this section I consider why economies as a whole fail to exhibit unconditional converge despite the strong pull of convergence within manufacturing industries.
Recall (from Table II ) that aggregate manufacturing does exhibit unconditional convergence. There is some evidence that convergence gets stronger the more we disaggregate -23-within manufacturing. But it is clear that the bulk of the convergence failure takes place as we go from manufacturing (in aggregate) to the rest of the economy. So I will focus here on the contrasting behaviors of manufacturing and the economy (both as a whole), abstracting from aggregation issues within manufacturing.
To compare manufacturing to the rest of the economy we need data that go beyond what we have been using so far. I proceed by combining INDSTAT2 with Penn World Tables 7.0 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011, PWT), which include data on aggregate GDP and (implicitly) total employment. Since data for GDP are in real PPP-adjusted terms in PWT, we first convert these to current dollars to render the economy-wide data directly comparable to INDSTAT2.
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Subtracting INDSTAT2 manufacturing value added and employment levels from the aggregates in PWT yields presumptive values for non-manufacturing. We thereby obtain labor productivity figures for non-manufacturing and the entire economy that are consistent with both data sets. The employment shares of manufacturing and non-manufacturing can be imputed in a similar fashion.
18 17 PWT includes data on real GDP per worker (rgdpwok), which is PPP converted GDP chain per worker at 2005 constant prices. To undertake the conversion, first we recover the conversion factor between current and constant prices, by taking the ratio of current and constant price GDP data in PWT. For current GDP data we use PPP Converted GDP Per Capita, G-K method, at current prices (in I$) (cgdp). For constant price GDP data we use PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Laspeyres), derived from growth rates of c, g, i, at 2005 constant prices (rgdpl). The ratio of these two values (cgdp / rgdpl) gives a price conversion factor between current and constant. Next we calculate a conversion factor between market prices and PPP. For this we use the PWT values for Purchasing Power Parity over GDP in national currency units per US$ (ppp) divided by the Exchange Rate to US$ in national currency units per US$ (xrat). Using these two conversion factors, we convert PWT's data on real GDP per worker into nominal US dollars (ngdpwok = rgdpwok * (cgdp / rgdpl) *( ppp / xrat)). This gives us nominal GDP Chain per worker at current prices (US$).
18 To compute the employment share of manufacturing, we first compute the total working population using data from PWT. To do this, we divide PWT data on GDP per capita (rgdpch) by data on GDP per worker (rgdpwok). This gives us the number of "workers per capita." From this number and the total population figures (pop) in PWT, we calculate total employment. Total manufacturing employment is given by INDSTAT2 as the number of workers in manufacturing as a whole, in ISIC category "D". From this and the total employment number computed using PWT, the employment share of manufacturing (α) can be calculated.
We can now compare convergence behavior systematically across different types of activities. I focus in this section on the 1995-2005 cross section, as these regressions do not mix different time periods and are the easiest ones to interpret in the present context. Column (2) of Table VI verifies the absence of unconditional convergence in non-manufacturing. The estimated convergence coefficient is very small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Column (3) replicates the exercise for economy-wide labor productivity, again confirming non-convergence.
For comparison purposes the bottom panel of the table shows the analogous results for the full panel.
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Other columns in Table VI highlight the importance of the relative size of manufacturing in driving convergence behavior. The employment share of manufacturing (α) appears to be a key conditioning factor. As columns (5)- (7) show, α is a significant determinant of economywide growth. More importantly for our purposes, aggregate convergence seems to be conditional on α. Comparing columns (3) and (7), we see that initial economy-wide productivity turns statistically significant in the aggregate growth equation once we control for α. These are of course sparse specifications that do not rule out alternative interpretations; α could be proxying for a wide range of other conditioning variables with which it is correlated. The "conditional" convergence rate controlling for α is relatively low (1 percent) in light of estimates in Barro
To compute non-manufacturing labor-productivity, we convert PWT's data on Total PPP converted GDP, G-K method, at current prices in millions I$ (tcgdp) to nominal GDP, using the PPP -Exchange Rate conversion factor described in the previous note (ppp / xrat). Non-manufacturing value added is calculated as the difference between this nominal value and the value added for manufacturing as a whole from INDSTAT2, in ISIC category "D". This number is then divided by non-manufacturing employment (the difference between total employment and total manufacturing employment), to give non-manufacturing labor productivity. From these numbers, growth rates can be calculated to run convergence regressions for non-manufacturing.
19 Interestingly, non-manufacturing and the aggregate economy appear to exhibit some unconditional convergence in the baseline sample, at a rate of around 1 percent, or one-third that for manufacturing in the same sample. However, this is not robust and seems to be a result of the correlation between the initial levels of productivity in manufacturing and non-manufacturing. When initial manufacturing productivity is also included in the regression, the coefficient on initial non-manufacturing productivity actually turns positive in both the aggregate economy and non-manufacturing growth regressions (while manufacturing productivity is negative and significant).
-25-(2012), so it is likely that this proxying is imperfect. In any case, these results are suggestive of the role played by the relative size of manufacturing in explaining convergence behavior across countries.
To investigate the issue more formally, let us divide the economy into manufacturing (m) and non-manufacturing (n) activities. GDP per worker is the weighted average of labor productivity in these two activities: = + (1 − ) , where the weight is the share of the economy's labor force employed in manufacturing. (We have dropped country subscripts to avoid clutter.) Growth in GDP per worker is in turn expressed as
where a "^" over a variable denotes proportional growth rates as before, and = / and = / are the productivity premia/discounts for the two sectors.
We now impose some further structure on the growth decomposition expressed above, using the convergence results we have obtained thus far. In particular, we write the growth rates of manufacturing and non-manufacturing as:
where g is the underlying long-term balanced growth rate of the economy, * y is the productivity frontier in manufacturing, m y is manufacturing labor productivity in the home economy, and β (> 0) is the convergence coefficient in manufacturing. This formulation captures the basic asymmetry between manufacturing and non-manufacturing, namely that manufacturing is the beneficiary of a convergence "kick," which peters out as the economy gets closer to the frontier.
Substituting these in and noting that 1 )
, economy-wide growth becomes
So growth equals an exogenous (or country-specific) component, a manufacturing convergence factor (that is decreasing in the level of manufacturing productivity), and a reallocation term. The reallocation term captures the effect of changes in the composition of employment across sectors when productivities differ between manufacturing and non-manufacturing. In particular, since > in the data, an increase in manufacturing employment share ( α d ) raises growth. We shall denote the reallocation term as
Equation (4) is helpful to understand why manufacturing convergence does not translate into aggregate convergence. Most critically, it highlights the role of α, the share of manufacturing employment. The economy-wide impact of manufacturing growth is mediated through this variable. One characteristic of poor countries is that they have very small formal manufacturing sectors. The average α for the poorest half of our baseline sample is only around 5 percent. This means that even quite powerful convergence effects for manufacturing have only tiny consequences for the economy as a whole. The manufacturing premium tends to be larger in poorer countries, but in practice this only partly compensates for the lower α (see below).
In light of this, we would need the reallocation term Δ to be not only large, but also to vary systematically with incomes, with poorer countries benefiting substantially more from reallocation towards manufacturing. However, we fail to find such strong and systematic reallocation effects in the data.
We illustrate these arguments with a numerical exercise, which quantifies equation (4). For β, we use 0.020, which is the value estimated for this sample of observations. 20 For y* we use the average manufacturing productivity in the top decile of the sample (for manufacturing productivity). The value of g is set equal to zero with no loss of generality. For each decile, the Table VII shows, this yields a predicted manufacturing growth rate of 7.1%, an aggregate convergence term of 0.7%, and a predicted overall growth rate that is actually slightly lower at 0.6%. Table 2 because we are working with the 1995-2005 sample here (and not the baseline sample). 21 We use end-of period m θ and n θ to compute Δ since we are dealing with discrete changes.
moderating the forces of convergence (column (1)). This is only partly offset by the fall in m θ (column (2)).
Furthermore, the reallocation term is tiny, often negative, and does not vary substantially across income levels to make much difference (column (6)). In principle, this term could have made a substantial contribution to convergence if labor were to move more rapidly to manufacturing in response to the large return differentials across sectors. The labor productivity differential between manufacturing and non-manufacturing ) (
is of the order of 300-700 percent for the lowest deciles. With a differential of 500 percent, even if α were to increase by 0.5 percent annually (resulting in roughly a 5 percentage point increase in the employment share of manufacturing over a decade), the poorest economies in the sample would experience a growth boost of around 5x0.5=2.5 percentage points. As it is, the actual change in α is a minute fraction of that, and often negative (as can be observed from the negative entries in column (6)). 23 Very similar results are obtained for the panel and baseline samples as well (not shown).
The net result is that the gradient for predicted economy-wide growth is barely distinguishable from zero (see column (7)). The difference between the gradients for manufactures and the aggregate economy is illustrated in Figure VI . In fact, the implied convergence factor for economy-wide growth is so small is that it would be easily swamped by random measurement error or unobserved country-level determinants. For example, the small negative gradient in Table VII for predicted overall growth becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero if we augment equation (4) with a random error term distributed normally with mean zero and variance 0.0001 (a standard deviation in unexplained growth rates across countries of just 1 percentage point).
In sum, aggregate non-convergence appears to be explained by the following combination of facts: (i) non-manufacturing activities do not exhibit unconditional convergence;
(ii) poor countries have little employment in manufacturing, depressing the contribution of manufacturing to overall growth; (iii) the share of employment in manufacturing rises over the course of development, giving less-poor countries a growth boost; and (iv) the reallocation effect is neither sizable enough nor systematically larger at lower income levels. In terms of quantitative magnitudes, it is the first two factors that play the dominant roles. From an economic standpoint, however, it is the last fact that is perhaps the most interesting one, pointing
to an important unexploited potential in poor countries.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
I have provided evidence in this paper that unconditional convergence is alive and well.
But one needs to look for it among manufacturing industries rather than entire economies. It is perhaps not surprising that manufacturing industries should exhibit unconditional convergence, and if the estimates here are to be believed, at quite a rapid pace too. These industries produce tradable goods and can be rapidly integrated into global production networks, facilitating technology transfer and absorption. Even when they produce just for the home market, they operate under competitive threat from efficient suppliers from abroad, requiring that they upgrade their operations and remain efficient. Traditional agriculture, many non-tradable services, and especially informal economic activities do not share these characteristics.
The findings in this paper offer new insight on the determinants of economic growth and convergence across countries. They suggest that lack of convergence is due not so much to -30-economy-wide misgovernance or endogenous technological change, but to specific circumstances that influence the speed of structural reallocation from non-convergence to convergence activities. The policies that matter are those that bear directly on this reallocation.
As discussed in McMillan and Rodrik (2011b) , what high-growth countries typically have in common is their ability to deploy policies that compensate for the market and government failures that block growth-enhancing structural transformation. Countries that manage to affect the requisite structural change grow rapidly while those that fail don't.
Put differently, successful countries experience both productivity convergence in formal manufacturing and rapid industrialization. Unsuccessful countries make do with just the former. Notes: Standard errors are clustered at country level, except for "all manufacturing" for which robust standard errors are reported.
Common sample refers to the set of countries that have data at all levels of aggregation showed in this table, for the same period. Asterisks denote the following significance levels: *** p < .01,** p < .05,* p < .1.
Baseline (ISIC 2-digit) ISIC 3-digit ISIC 4-digit All manufacturing Notes: These coefficients are obtained by running pure cross-section regressions for each industry separately. Levels of significance: *** p < .01,** p < .05,* p < .1, "n.s." = not significant. Asterisks denote the following significance levels: *** p < .01,** p < .05,* p < .1.
Dependent variable: decadal growth of labor productivity in
Panel specification pools data for 1965-1975, 1975-1985, 1985-1995, and 1995-2005 multiplying the change in α over the decade with the end-of-period differences in θs, and dividing the result by 10 to annualize it.
PREDICTED GROWTH RATES BY INCOME (GDP/WORKER) DECILE (1965-1975, 1975-1985, 1985-1995, 1995-2005) , controlling for decadal fixed effects. Source of data: PWT 7.0. Sample is restricted to countries included in the manufacturing convergence regressions.
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